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Presentations by Claire Guthrie Gastañaga
Education / Not-for-Profit
 Presentations / OpEd / Articles

Current Issues of Concern to Faculty
Presentation to Board of Virginia AAUP, October 20 2001000.

I.
Current Issues: Americans with Disabilities Act

A.
Definition of Disability


1.
Eyeglass wearing pilots with correctable vision held not disabled. Supreme Court said, “if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures -- both positive and negative -- must be taken into account when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under that Act.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Person whose blood pressure controlled by medication not disabled. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). Extends to self-accommodation. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 517 U.S. 516 (1999) (“no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems”). Popko v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 84 F.Supp.2d 589 (M.D.Pa.2000)(on remand for further consideration of whether plaintiff’s epileptic condition was a “disability” in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. Pacella v. Tufts Univ. School of Dental Medicine, 66 F. Supp.2d 234 (D.Mass. 1999)(as corrected vision does not substantially limit a major life activity). Tangires v. The Johns Hopkins Hospital, 79 F.Supp.2d 587 (D.Md. 2000)(employee with asthma not disabled where asthma was treatable with medication that she refused to take).


2.
ADD/ADHD disabilities?

B.
Reasonable Accommodation


1.
Indefinite unpaid leave not a reasonable accommodation. Lance v. University of Tennessee, 60 F.Supp.2d 773 (E.D.Tenn. 1999).


2.
Plaintiff permanently restricted to light duty work was no longer qualified for custodial position with or without accommodation. Could not perform functions of job. Scott v. University of Toledo, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 851 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).


3.
Student diagnosed with math learning disability failed to pass a required math class and therefore failed to obtain elementary education degree; university provided several accommodations but would not waive class or accept a D grade. Pangburn v. Northern Kentucky University, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6413 (6th Cir. 2000).

C.
Documentation


1.
Student has obligation to give college notice of disability and request reasonable accommodation/academic adjustment. Notice and request must be timely. Student must provide documentation.


2.
Documentation must show current disability. Guckenberger v. Boston University, 974 F.Supp.106 (D. Mass. 1997)(demands for documentation must reflect medical expertise re: currency and age; distinction between LD and ADD because of possibility of change in symptoms).


3.
Diagnostic professional must be qualified. Standard in the field.


4.
Documentation must be complete. How diagnosis was reached; qualifications of diagnostician; how are major life activities impacted; how disability affects academic difficulties; IEP may be insufficient on its own; request for adjustment must be consistent with documentation; if documentation is inadequate, institution must advise student in a timely fashion.


5.
College may conduct its own evaluation at its own expense.


6.
Academic adjustment must be provided while the student is being evaluated.



1.
Process for determining adjustments should be interactive.



2.
IDEA Families. Need to prepare for differences in expectations that students and parents may have based on their experience in public school setting. Should provide notice and train those handling orientation to refer to disability services coordinators.

D.
Access to Technology


1.
Use of technology is exploding: 1/4 of classes use internet as part of syllabus; use of email in classes up from 8% in 1996 to 44% in 1998.


2.
Qualified disabled students must have equal access to the program. Section 504, 29 U.S.C. 794, 34 C.F.R. 104; ADA, 28 C.F.R. 36.303, 28 CFR 35.160. Communication must be as effective. May consider alternatives as long as access to the program is equal. May need to provide training. Colleges must be proactive. See, Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F.Supp. 800 (D.Kan. 1994).


3.
What is access? facilities; computer workstations; materials, documentation and support; training and tech support; maintenance and repair of accessible features; course materials; on-line class discussion; submission of assignments.


4.
Consider accessibility in purchasing and leasing. Consider benefits of universal designs.


5.
Provide accessible technology in integrated setting.


6.
Includes web design (recommendations from DO-IT; University of Washington).


7.
Web Resources: “Bobby”, a website that can check other websites for accessibility, www.cast.org/bobby; Equal Access to Software and Information, www.rit.edu/~easi/>; Postsecondary Innovative Transition and Technology, www.wri-edu.org/postitt/>; Alliance for Technology Access, www.ataaccess.org/design.html.

E.
Testing


1.
See provisions on testing students with disabilities in revised (December 1999) Standards of the Joint Committee on Testing (American Psychological Association, National Council on Measurement in Education, and the American Educational Research Association); Bartlett v. New York State Board of Bar Examiners, 156 F.2d (2d Cir. 1998) vacated and remanded, 119 S.Ct. 2388 (June 21, 1999) (being reconsidered in light of Sutton case)(is a student with LD disabled under ADA?).


2.
Accommodation must be provided so that person can demonstrate his or her aptitude and achievement, not the effect of the disability (except where the functions impaired by the disability are the factors the test purports to measure). Not required to waive or lower essential program requirements or to fundamentally alter nature of program.


3.
Must be well-reasoned decision. Wynn v. Tufts University of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991) and 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992) and Guckenberger v. Boston University, 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998). Categorical denials of extra time beyond pre-set limits probably not okay. Must make individual determination.

F.
Psychological/mental Disabilities


1.
Dismissal of student because of a concern that, as a result of the student’s disability, the student might engage in conduct that poses a risk to health or safety, special standards apply that are designed to balance the legitimate concerns for safety with the goal of protecting disabled students from unfounded fears and prejudice. Must be a “direct threat.” School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). A “direct threat” is a significant risk of causing substantial harm to the health or safety of the student or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level through the provision of reasonable accommodation. Individualized assessment. Institution must identify the standards to be applied and give notice to the student that standard not met. Must make decision on reliable information: objective evidence and reasonable judgments relying on current medical knowledge. Doe v. NYU, 666 F.2d 761 (2nd Cir. 1981). General reference: Thomas J. Flygare, Students with Learning and Psychiatric Disabilities: New Challenges for Colleges (NACUA Publication Series 2000).

G.
Access to Facilities


1.
Title III of the ADA existing facilities approach is different from Title II and Section 504. Obligation to remove architectural barriers if “readily achievable.” Look at barriers not program. Use common sense.


2.
Internet resource: U.S. DOJ, “Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Duke University,” www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/duke.htm
II.
Current Issues: Employment Discrimination

A.
Training


1.
New incentives provided by Supreme Court.



a)
Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (employer prevention efforts relative to punitive damage claims)



b)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)(affirmative defense requires “employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior). Lower courts have applied this to harassment on the basis of race, Allen v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999) and disability, Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1004 (1999).


2.
The federal government has proposed amendments to the FAR that would impose training on entities that receive federal grants and contracts. 64 Fed. Reg. 37359 (July 9, 1999). Contractor qualifications to include “workplace practices addressing matters such as training, worker retention, safety programs and legal compliance.” See, www.noblacklisting.org.


3.
Some states also have training requirements. See, “The Emerging Law of Training,” by G. Mathiason and M. deBernardo, Federal Lawyer 25, 26 (May 1998).


4.
Disheartening statistics published by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, Under-Managed Risk: Employment Claims Drive Rising ELL Occurrences and Costs: A Summary of Findings from the 1997 Educators Legal Liability Coverage Survey (800-525-6741):
No training on sexual harassment offered by half of institutions surveyed; on ADA by two thirds; on employee terminations by three quarters. About 80% don’t train committees that make rank and tenure decision, resolve grievances or conduct searches.


5.
Internet resources:



a)
University of New Mexico --www.unm.edu/~hrinfo/Eod/workshops/civilrightstrng.htm linking to www.unm.edu/~hrinfo/civilrights/intro.htm.



b)
University of Washington -- www.washington.edu/admin/traindev/index.html.



c)
www.preventivepractices.com, on-line sexual harassment course for faculty and other university employees and students.

B.
ADR/Mandatory Arbitration


1.
Some employers are choosing to require new employees, as a condition of hiring, to waive their right to resolve employment disputes in a judicial forum and to have all such disputes resolved through arbitration. Some employers are also requiring current employees to sign such waivers as a condition of promotion, receipt of salary increases or to keep their jobs.


2.
Where employees have entered such agreements but nevertheless sought to sue under state or federal laws, employers have responded by filing motions to compel arbitration. Most of these cases have been decided in favor of the employers. The Supreme Court affirmed in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001) that arbitration clauses in employment contracts are enforcible and the Federal Arbitration Act applies.


3.
EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997), www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.txt.


4.
Where enforced, courts tend to agree on following:



a)
agreements must be voluntary on part of employee;



b)
there is consideration for the waiver;



c)
arbitration process protects employee rights;



d)
Section 119 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not prohibit arbitration of claims brought under Title VII, the ADEA or other federal civil rights laws.


5.
To increase enforceability of arbitration clauses:



a)
binding on employer and employee;



b)
use OWBPA waiver as a model for waiver;



c)
provide for full range of authorized remedies;



d)
require arbitrators to be trained in employment discrimination law; and



e)
provide for limited judicial review.

C.
Retaliation


1.
Employees may bring retaliation claim regardless of validity of their underlying discrimination claim but there will be no retaliation claim where no reasonable person could have believed that a single minor incident violated Title VII. Clark County School District v. Breeden, USSCt, Docket No. 00-866 (2001)


2.
Cause of action arises under separate section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(i)(opposition) (Martin v. Howard University, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19516 (D.D.C 1999) and (ii)(participation). Also under ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and Equal Pay Act.


3.
Exposure may be great.



a)
Jury awarded a former university employee $1,500,000 in Starkes v. Florida Board of Regents, No. 98-669-CIV-T-25B (M.D. Fla. 1999), after finding that university discriminated against her on the basis of race and terminated her in retaliation for filing charge with EEOC.



b)
Two professors awarded $1,800,000 after a jury found that the university had subjected them to changes of class schedules, charges of insubordination, and negative performance evaluations following their claim of reverse discrimination. Gentner v. Cheyney Univ., No. Civ. A. 94-7443, 1999 WL 820864 at *3 (E.D. Pa. October 14, 1999).


4.
Claim has three elements: engaged in participation or opposition; suffered an adverse employment action; and there is causal connection between protected activity and the adverse action. Employer may rebut by articulating a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for action (doesn’t have to prove that it is the real reason). Employee then must show reason is a pretext.


5.
Provision in a University collective bargaining agreement that required a choice between internal grievance and EEOC charge was retaliatory on its face under ADEA. EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 906 (1992).

D.
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures


1.
The Uniform Guidelines have been adopted by the EEOC (29 C.F.R. 1607), the Civil Service Commission, and the Departments of Labor (41 C.F.R. 60, Justice (28 C.F.R. 50.14) and the Treasury. Apply in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. These are not regulations and do not have the force of law. Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986). See, also, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (4/5ths rule is a “rule of thumb”). But, there are rules on recordkeeping and reporting, 29 C.F.R. 1602, as amended by 56 Fed. Reg. 35, 753 (July 26, 1991).


2.
“Best hiring procedures” not required. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).


3.
Anything you use (employment application, resume, background investigation, former employer references, criminal records check) to determine whether or not to hire a candidate is considered a selection instrument. This is true whether the criterion is an objective test or a subjective method. Each criterion used (not just the bottom line) can be examined for an adverse impact. Connecticut v. Teal, 467 U.S. 440 (1982).


4.
Internet References



a)
hr-guide.com/software and www.acd.ccac.edu/hr/employment statistics/disparate impact/analysis4.cgi
discriminatory impact analysis; utilization analysis



b)
humanresources.ucr.edu/hrunits/employment/RecruitInterSelectGuide.htm\
model campus procedures



c)
www.uniformguidelines.com
Questions and Answers on Guidelines and Labor Department Report on use of tests and assessments.
III.
Current Issues: Faculty/Institutional Relationships

A.
First Amendment/Harassment


1.
Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996). (sexual harassment policy unconstitutionally vague; did not provide professor with notice that his conduct would be prohibited). See, Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College: The Scope of Academic Freedom Within the Context of Sexual Harassment Claims and In-Class Speech, 25 Journal of College & University Law 1 (1998).


2.
Sexual harassment policies “must be narrowly drawn to address the specific evil at hand.” Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971. See, Ohio State University Policy discussed in Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Legal Compendium 373 (Elsa Kircher Cole, ed., National Association of College and University Attorneys, 3rd ed. 1997).


3.
Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (college professor was disciplined for his gratuitous in-class use of the words "pussy," "cunt," and "fuck," which had given rise to a sexual harassment complaint filed by one of the professor's students. Id. at 803. Because Bonnell's offensive language was "not germane to the subject matter," the court concluded that he did "not have a constitutional right to use [these terms] in a classroom setting." Id. at 820)

B.
Institutional vs. Individual Academic Freedom


1.
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Education, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998), (held that a high school teacher does not have a First Amendment right in the secondary school's curriculum itself; choice of plays).


2.
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir., 2000)( to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of "academic freedom" above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors, and is not violated by the terms of the Act.); see also Webb v. Ball State University, 167 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir., 1999).


3.
Edwards v. California University of Penn., 156 F.3d 488 (3rd Cir. 1998), (freedom to decide what is taught in the classroom and how it is taught belong to the educational institution. "When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”).


4.
But see, Hardy v. Jefferson County Community College, No. 99-00477, 6th Circuit, August 15, 2001(As a public employee, Hardy must show that (1) he was disciplined for speech that was directed toward an issue of public concern, and (2) his interest in speaking as he did outweighed the College's interest in regulating his speech. “Although Hardy's in-class speech does not itself constitute pure public debate, it does relate to matters of overwhelming public concern -- race, gender, and power conflicts in our society.” a teacher's in-class speech deserves constitutional protection. See Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 823 (holding that "a professor's rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting"); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that the "First Amendment's protection of academic freedom" applies to teachers' in-class discussions).).


5.
David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 227, 242-244 (1990).

C.
Hiring/references


1.
Hiring practices should be position-specific, use valid and reliable selection measures, involve trained search committees and managers.


2.
Failure to screen potential employee adequately may lead to liability for negligent hiring. Factors in determining reasonableness of inquiry. Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, 501 A.2d 35 (Md. 1985) (cost of inquiry, ready availability of adverse info, type of position).


3.
Employers generally have a qualified privilege to provide a post employment reference unless they act with malice making defamatory statement with intent to harm or provide information not relevant to prospective employer’s employment decision. Many states have codified this common law privilege. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1 (effective July 1, 2000).

D.
Early Retirement


1.
Private institutions must consider ERISA, federal income and social security tax and Age Discrimination Act of 1967. Public plans not subject to ERISA.


2.
Tenure buyout payments may not be wages subject to FICA taxes. North Dakota State University v. United States, No. A3-98-50 (D.N.D. 1999).


3.
Deferred compensation questions under § 457(f) must be resolved.


4.
The Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) enacted in 1990 amended the ADEA by extending age discrimination coverage to employee benefits and overturning Betts v. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)(court had held that bona fide benefit plans not meant to evade the law exempt from ADEA). Also established strict requirements for waivers of age discrimination claims. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), 29 C.F.R. 1625.22: writing; advice to consult with an attorney; no waiver of later claims; consideration; 45 days to consider any waiver attached to an exit incentive; each participant has 7 days to revoke after signing/can’t be waived. Party asserting validity of waiver must prove it complied with OWBPA and was knowing and voluntary. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (f)(3); Raczak v. Ameritech, 103 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1997).

E.
Revocation of Tenure


1.
In breach of contract actions where termination for cause challenged, one question is whether jury should review facts of the alleged misconduct de novo. In Murphy v. Duquesne University, 745 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. 1999), the court held that judicial review of the president’s decision to revoke tenure was limited to court’s review of whether there was substantial evidence in the record of internal proceedings to support conclusion that faculty member had engaged in substantial misconduct. See also, Yackshaw v. John Carroll University Board of Trustees, 89 Ohio App.3d 237, 624 N.E.2d 225, 229 (1993). But see, McConnell v. Howard University, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C.Cir. 1987).


2.
Resource: See generally, Good Practice in Tenure Evaluation, A Joint Project of the American Council on Education, the AAUP and United Educators (ACE 2000).

F.
Intellectual Property


1.
Key issue is whether the work for hire doctrine applies to faculty-authored educational materials. Before the 1976 Copyright Act was passed, codifying decades of case law that had evolved under the 1909 Act, there was a “teacher” exception. Many think that the exception did not survive the 1976 codification because Section 101 of a work for hire makes no reference to it. Some courts have determined that the exception no longer exists. The University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid, 880 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Colo. 1995)(finding a journal article to be a work for hire) but see Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987)( University policy which is part of each professor’s contract provides for faculty ownership of scholarly articles.)


2.
Internet reference: www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty; authored by Georgia Harper, Office of General Counsel, University of Texas System, it is the best overall resource on copyright that exists.


3.
Patent protection for teaching methods may be coming. Trademark Office has granted patents for a business method. Business methods and teaching methods are not readily distinguishable especially in an on-line environment. Patentable subject matter; novelty and nonobviousness, State Street Bank Trust v. Signet Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Example of patent – Amazon one-click ordering.


4.
Conflicts of Interest and Commitment. Faculty conflict of interest and conflict of commitment policies should be reviewed with on-line education in mind. For example, a prominent professor at Harvard, Arthur Miller, supplied videotaped lectures to a competing institution without Harvard’s permission.


5.
TEACH Act. Currently the Section 110 (2) exception in the Copyright Act for classroom teaching that allows a work to be displayed in class does not apply to distance education or on-line courses. Senate Bill S. 487, the Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act would amend Sections 110 and 112 of the Copyright Act to allow instructors to use portions of copyrighted works in on-line courses without the need to seek permission from copyright owners. The bill passed the Senate on June 7th. On June 28, the House Judiciary Committee on Courts, Internet and Intellectual Property approved the bill without amendments and sent it on to full committee for consideration.


6.
Distance learning policy development resources: Ownership of New Works at the University: Unbundling of Rights and the Pursuit of Higher Learning (CETUS), www.cetus.org/ownership.pdf; Developing a Distance Education Policy for the 21st Century (ACE), www.acenet.edu.home.html; Intellectual Property Policy and New Media Technologies: A Framework for Policy Development at AAU Institutions (AAU), www.tulane.edu/~aau/IPNewMediaReport.html; Who Owns the Rights to Instructional Materials? Rethinking Intellectual Property at the University (CIC), www.cic.uiuc.edu/resources/ip/copyrtconf99.html.


7.
Faculty interest in class notes. Does inclusion of notes from class sessions for sale on-line violate the law?



a)
Expression of an idea not protected until fixed in a tangible medium; lecture from notes not protected unless professor is reading verbatim or lecture is being recorded by professor when delivered.



b)
License to take notes probably does not extend to commercial use.



c)
Even student’s notes from lecture may be derivative work.



d)
Common law copyright supplements federal statute. Williams v. Weiser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726 (1960).



e)
Internet resources: “Teaching Law: The Legal Protection of Education and Its Relevance for Online Notes Companies,“ Mathieu Deflam, www.sla.purdue.edu/people/soc/mdeflem/zteachlaw.htm, “Ownership of Lectures: Commercial Notetaking in University Courses,” www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/lectures.htm.
IV.
Other Current Issues

A.
Access to Campus/Individuals and Outside Groups


1.
Physical forum for expression of views must be open to all regardless of view. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).

B.
11th Amendment Immunity


1.
Congress cannot abrogate the constitutional immunity of states from suit unless the statute was passed under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Congress’ powers under § 5 are limited to enforcing the actual substantive guarantees of the 14th Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)(Congress must make specific findings that the substantive guarantees of the 14th Amendment are being violated).


2.
1999 Trilogy: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999)(Flores standards must be applied in determining whether attempt to abrogate was passed pursuant to § 5); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2220 (1999)(express waiver required; not constructive or implied); Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999)(principles equally applicable to suits in state court).


3.
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000)(Senior university faculty members alleged age discrimination related to alleged age-based evaluation system and salary payments; sought back pay and punitive damages from public university employers. Supreme Court said that Congress violated the 11th Amendment in subjecting states to suits for damages under the ADEA).


4.
Cases only apply to suits brought by individuals and not to suits brought by federal government.


5.
Cases pending and decided: ADA (Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garatt, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001), bars individual recovery against states and state agencies), Copyright Act, Environmental statutes, Equal Pay Act (Varner v. Illinois State University, 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000) cert. filed 00-1277 (2001)), FMLA, IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, Title IX (Litman v. GMU, constructive waiver through receipt of federal funds, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1220 (2000)), Title VII (Cooper v. St. Cloud University, 226 F.3d 964(8th. Cir 2000), Maitland v. University of Minnesota, No. 002192 (8th Cir.)).


6.
Issues for the future: can Congress constitutionally require states to waive sovereign immunity to participate in a federal program, receive federal funds?
V.
Legal Resources

A.
General Resource, especially for private colleges, Catholic University General Counsel’s webpage: www.counsel.cua.edu/mainpage/index.htm.

B.
Legal Links at www.nacua.org.

C.
Kaplin and Lee, The Law of Higher Education.

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